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DUAL CHARACTER CONTRIBUTIONS: A PROPOSED




Charitable fund raising is a billion dollar industry in the United States.2
Federal, state, and local governments, relying on increased charitable giv-
ing, have reduced their spending for charitable programs.3 In turn, individ-
uals have substantially increased4 their charitable contributions.5
Congress has long recognized that charitable contributions are vital to
many organizations.6 To encourage donations to charities, Congress per-
mits taxpayers to claim charitable contributions as itemized deductions.
However, payments are deductible under Section 170 of the Internal Reve-
l. The author extends his gratitude to Patricia C. Bradford, Professor, Marquette University
Law School, for her continued assistance in the development of this Comment.
2. Athornia Steele, Regulation of Charitable Solicitation: A Review and Proposal, 13 J. LEGIS.
149, 152 (1986). In 1989, contributions to charitable organizations totaled $114.7 billion. In
1980, contributions totaled $48.7 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 378 (11lth ed. 1991).
3. For example, President Reagan, in formulating his economic recovery program, assumed
charitable contributions would increase:
Historically, the American people have supported by voluntary contributions more artistic
and cultural activities than all other countries in the world put together. I wholeheartedly
support this approach and believe that Americans will continue their generosity. There-
fore, I'm proposing a savings of $85 million in the Federal subsidies now going to the arts
and humanities.
Steele, supra note 2, at 150 n.12 (citation omitted).
4. Individuals provided $40.7 billion (83.6%) of the total $48.7 billion contributions in 1980.
In 1989, individuals increased their contributions to $96.4 billion (84.6%) of the total $114.7
billion contributions. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 378.
5. In 1989, charitable contributions were allocated as follows: religion (47.4%), health
(9.3%), education (8.7%), human services (10%), arts (6.5%), society benefit/public (3.1%), and
all other (15%). Id.
6. The allowance of a charitable contribution deduction has benefitted taxpayers, charitable
organizations, and the government in the following ways:
(1) taxpayers are able to satisfy their philanthropic needs by making charitable contribu-
tions that qualify for a tax deduction;
(2) many essential service organizations receive private contributions that have been en-
couraged by the allowance of charitable deductions; and
(3) the deduction for charitable contributions has alleviated financial pressure on the gov-
ernment to be the sole source of funding for organizations providing essential charitable
services.
7 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 31.01 (Martin Weinstein et al. eds., 1991).
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nue Code7 ("Code") only if they satisfy specified requirements.' One re-
quirement is that the payment must be a contribution or a gift.9
Generally, a charitable contribution is not a gift if the contributor ex-
pects a substantial benefit in return.10 In some cases, however, contribu-
tions may be both part gift and part purchase of return benefits. These
types of contributions are known as dual character payments, or dual pay-
ments. Congress recognized that charitable contributions would be dis-
couraged if the substantial return benefit rule applied to all dual
payments. 2 Therefore, although dual payments are not entirely deductible,
taxpayers may deduct part of their payment if the contribution exceeds the
fair market value of benefits received in return, and if such excess was
knowingly contributed as a gift.13
Despite this two-part test, some charities negligently or intentionally
provide erroneous information to taxpayers about what portion of a dual
payment is deductible. The purpose of this Comment is to deter this behav-
7. I.R.C. § 170 (1988). Section 170 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Allowance of deduction
(1) General rule. - There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contributions
(as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charita-
ble contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary.
(c) Charitable contribution defined. - For purposes of this section, the term "charita-
ble contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof ....
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment).
Id.
8. The percentage limitations described in § 170(b) are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Such limitations provide the maximum amount of charitable contributions a taxpayer may deduct
in one taxable year, known as a contribution base. See generally 3 BENDER'S FEDERAL TAX
SERVICE § A:17.141-146 (1990). A taxpayer may deduct a charitable contribution under § 170
only if the payment is made to a qualified donee. Individuals are not qualified donees; Section
170(c), however, lists the following qualified donees: (1) governmental organizations for public
purposes; (2) corporation, trust, community chest, fund, or foundation; (3) a post or organization
of war veterans; (4) a domestic fraternal society, order, or association, operating under the lodge
system; and (5) a cemetery company owned and operated not for profit. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988).
9. I.R.C. § 170(c). This section does not define the terms "contribution" or "gift."





ior and facilitate taxpayer compliance. The purpose is not to discourage
contributions or impose a heavy burden on charities.
Section II of this Comment defines dual character payments and the
valuation procedure used to measure the fair market value of any return
benefits.14 Section III explains the two-part test used to determine if a dual
payment is deductible.' 5 Section IV sets forth the guidelines charities
should use if they solicit dual payments'6 and discusses the concerns of
Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that charities not provide
erroneous or false information to taxpayers.1 7
Section V examines existing penalties to determine if they effectively de-
ter charities from providing false information to taxpayers."l Finally, Sec-
tion VI sets forth a proposed penalty, modelled after negligence penalties, to
deter charities from engaging in this behavior.19 Included in this discussion
are the reasons why Congress should enact a new penalty.
II. DUAL CHARACTER PAYMENTS DEFINED
In United States v. American Bar Endowment,20 the Supreme Court de-
fined when a dual character payment is deductible as a charitable contribu-
tion. To understand the tax law regarding dual payments, one must first
define charitable contributions.
A. Charitable Contribution Must Be a Gift
A charitable contribution is deductible only if it is a gift.21 The term
"4gift" is defined as "a payment of money or transfer of property without
adequate consideration." '22 A payment or transfer is not a gift if the con-
tributor receives or expects to receive a substantial benefit in return.23
Thus, when a taxpayer makes a charitable contribution, it is critical to ex-
amine the return benefit, if any, received by the taxpayer.
If a taxpayer makes a payment to a charity and receives no return bene-
fit or merely a token benefit, the entire payment is a gift. In contrast, if a
14. See infra notes 20-50 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 89-139 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 140-162 and accompanying text.
20. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
21. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988). Courts have stated that the terms "contribution" and "gift" are
synonymous. See, e.g., DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962).
22. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977); see Rev. Rul. 67-246,
1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.
23. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
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taxpayer makes a contribution to a charity and receives a benefit in return
that is equal in value to the contribution, there is no gift. Where a payment
is made to a charity in connection with a fund-raising event or the purchase
of an item, a presumption arises that no gift has been made. 4 The payment
is presumed to be the purchase price for the benefit received." The pre-
sumption is overcome if the donation exceeds the return benefit, and the
taxpayer believes that he or she is making a charitable contribution. 6
Although the foregoing contributions generally are not considered gifts,
they may be treated as part gift and part purchase if the taxpayer establishes
that the payment exceeds the value of the benefit received or expected to be
received.2 7  Such payments are considered to be "dual character pay-
ments."28 For example, assume that charity X solicits contributions to at-
tend a fund-raising dinner. A taxpayer pays $100 and receives a ticket to
the dinner. The ticket states that the value of the dinner is $25 and the
excess amount, $75, is a deductible charitable contribution to X. Under
these circumstances, the $100 contribution by the taxpayer is a dual pay-
ment. It consists of a $25 purchase price and a $75 gift.
Charitable organizations frequently solicit dual payments made in con-
nection with admission to fund-raising activities such as charity balls, ba-
zaars, banquets, shows, and athletic events. 29 The charity uses the event as
an occasion to solicit gifts in addition to the sale of admissions or other
benefits.30
B. Valuation of Personal Benefits
The general rule is that return benefits are valued at fair market value
(FMV), based on the cost of comparable benefits. 31 The type of return ben-
efit is irrelevant to the availability of the deduction.32 For example, return
benefits could include such items as merchandise, admission to events, and
24. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.
25. ia at 105.
26. MkL at 107.
27. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117.
28. For examples of contributions that are part gift and part purchase price, see 3 BENDER'S
FEDERAL TAX SERVICE, supra note 8, § A:17.41(4).
29. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 104.
30. Id.
31. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117.
32. Richard T. Helleloid et al., Deduction of Charitable Contributions with Personal Benefits
Remains Uncertain, 73 J. TAX'N 210, 211 (1990). The legislative history of § 170 suggests that
only a financial-type return benefit will deny or decrease the deduction. "Financial," however,
does not necessarily mean "monetary." Id.; see infra notes 38-46 for treatment of spiritual return
benefit.
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fund-raising dinners.33 If the benefit has no similar counterpart, a reason-
able estimate of the fair market value may be used.34
An exception applies to minor benefits such as bookmarks, calendars,
mugs, and posters bearing the organization's name or logo.3 Because the
value of these items is minimal,3 6 they may be disregarded in determining
the amount of the contributor's gift.3 7
Historically, the valuation of benefits received from religious organiza-
tions was controversial because it was difficult to distinguish between intan-
gible benefits, which have an indeterminate value, and more tangible
benefits, such as the right to occupy a particular pew during religious serv-
ices.38 Prior to Hernandez v. Commissioner,39 courts were in conflict on
whether payments to a church for auditing and training sessions constitute
gifts and are therefore deductible as a charitable contribution.' Hernandez
33. For a discussion on amounts paid for a chance to participate in raffles, lotteries, or similar
games, see 3 BENDER'S FEDERAL TAX SERVICE, supra note 8, § A:17.41(8)(c).
34. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 106.
35. The new guidelines are contained in Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, and were released
as News Release IR-90-20 on February 6, 1990. For a summary of these guidelines, see infra note
37.
36. Generally, the cost of these items is less than $10.
37. Full Charitable Deduction Allowed Despite Benefit, 18 TAX'N FOR LAW. 367, 368 (1990).
The guidelines contained in Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 472, are summarized as follows:
Benefits received in connection with a payment to a charity will be considered to have
insubstantial fair market value ... if either:
(a) The fair market value of all the benefits received in connection with the payment is not
more than 2 percent of the payment, or $50, whichever is less, or
(b) The payment is at least $25, adjusted for inflation, and the only benefits received in
connection with the payment are token items (bookmarks, calendars, keychains, mugs,
posters, etc.) bearing the organization's name or logo. The cost of all the benefits received
by each donor must be within the limits established for low-cost articles in § 513(h)(2). An
item is a low-cost article for purposes of § 513(h)(2) if its cost does not exceed $5, increased
by a cost of living adjustment. For 1992, the cost cannot exceed approximately $6.48.
Id.
38. See Helleloid, supra note 32, at 214. In some circumstances, payment to a charity may
provide personal and charitable benefits that are so intertwined that separate calculations are not
possible. Id. The United States Supreme Court, in Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990),
established the criteria for determining the deductibility of payments in these cases.
39. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
40. See Ted D. Billbe II, Comment, Should Payments to a Church for Participation in Reli-
gious Practices Be Tax Deductible?, 25 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 739 (1988); Daniel Mitz, Comment,
Save Your Local Church or Synagogue: When Are Taxpayer Contributions to Religious Organiza-
tions Deductible Under Section 170?, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 840, 861 (1988); see also David C. Lin-
der, Comment, The Deductibility of Fixed Donations Made to Churches as Charitable
Contributions Under the Internal Revenue Code: Staples v. Commissioner, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1055 (1988). Compare Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S.
1103 (1989) (holding that payments to a church with no benefit other than participation in reli-
gious practices are deductible) with Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
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involved a taxpayer who made contributions to the Church of Scientology
and received "auditing" sessions that the Church provided.4" No refund
was allowed if the sessions were not attended. The taxpayer argued that
these sessions were spiritual benefits and that their indeterminate value did
not reduce the amount of his gift to the church.42 The taxpayer also argued
that "payments made for the right to participate in religious services should
be automatically deductible."43
The Supreme Court held that such payments are deductible only if they
were a gift.' As a result, no deduction is allowed if the taxpayer received
or expected to receive a substantial benefit in return.45 This analysis is ap-
plicable even though the benefit received is purely religious in nature.46
Another controversial valuation issue involved payments made to edu-
cational institutions in exchange for the right to purchase tickets to athletic
events. Congress resolved this issue by enacting Section 170().'7 That sec-
tion provides that eighty percent of a payment made to an institution of
490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding that where a taxpayer cannot participate in religious services unless
taxpayer pays the required price, payment is not deductible).
41. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684.
42. Id at 692.
43. Id
44. Id
45. Id. The plaintiffs did not argue that their payments qualified as dual payments and that
they were therefore entitled to a partial deduction to the extent the payments exceeded the value
of the benefit received. Consequently, the Court could not rule on whether the test in United
States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986), applies in these cases.
46. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690. The Court held that payments to a church that generate
religious benefits are not automatically deductible. Instead, the payment is deductible only if such
payment is a "contribution or gift." The Court resolved the split in authority created by Graham
and Staples. See supra note 40. For a critical analysis of Hernandez, see Carol A. Jones, Com-
ment, Hernandez v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Forces a Square Peg into a Round Hole,
25 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 917 (1990); David M. Phipps, Comment, A Line Drawn by Unsteady
Hands: Section 170, Charitable Contributions and Return Benefits in Hernandez v. C.I.R., 23
AKRON L. Rlv. 575 (1990); see also Mark L. Geier, Note, What the Good Lord Giveth, Uncle
Sam Taketh Away: A Proposal Allowing Payments Made in Exchange for Religious Benefits to Be
Tax Deductible, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 433 (1990).
47. I.R.C. § 170(m) (1988). Section 170(1) (Supp. 11 1990) provides in pertinent part:
(1) In general.-For purposes of this section, 80 percent of any amount described in
paragraph (2) shall be treated as a charitable contribution.
(2) Amount described. For purposes of paragraph (1), an amount is described in this
paragraph if-
(A) the amount is paid by the taxpayer to or for the benefit of an educational organiza-
tion ....
(B) such amount would be allowable as a deduction under this section but for the fact
that the taxpayer receives (directly or indirectly) as a result of paying such amount the
right to purchase tickets for seating at an athletic event in an athletic stadium of such
institution.
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higher learning for the right to purchase tickets to athletic events is a chari-
table deduction a.4  This college sports rule applies regardless of whether a
taxpayer actually purchases tickets.49 However, if any part of the payment
is made to purchase tickets, it does not fall within the eighty percent rule.50
Furthermore, the payment would not constitute a gift because the value of
the ticket would equal the amount of the payment.
III. DEDUCTIBILITY OF DUAL CHARACTER PAYMENTS
The general rule regarding charitable contributions is that payments are
not deductible if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in return."
However, in United States v. American Bar Endowment,52 the Supreme
Court recognized that "[w]here the size of the payment is clearly out of
proportion to the benefit received, it would not serve the purposes of [Sec-
tion] 170 to deny a deduction altogether."53 Prior to that decision, the IRS
and the courts were in conflict concerning how to determine whether a dual
payment was deductible.
A. Conflicting Standards Prior to the ABE Decision
In 1967, the IRS devised a two-pronged test to determine how much, if
any, of a dual payment is deductible. 4 First, the payment must exceed the
fair market value of the benefit received.55 Second, the excess payment
must be made with the intention of making a gift.5 6 Three years later, the
tax court adopted this test in Murphy v. Commissioner.57
In the following two years, courts criticized the application of these
criteria to charitable contributions because they emphasized the tax-
payer's subjective motives.58 For example, in Singer Co. v. United States,59
48. I.R.C. § 170(l) (Supp. 11 1990).
49. See Helleloid, supra note 32, at 212.
50. Id. For example, assume a taxpayer paid $200 to an educational institution for the right
to purchase tickets at an athletic event. In addition, the taxpayer received $20 worth of football
tickets. In this case, the charitable contribution would be $180. The deduction is reduced by the
fair market value of the tickets.
51. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 117.
54. The test appeared in Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 54 T.C. 249 (1970). In Murphy, a husband and wife made an "adoptive fee payment" to
an adoption agency. The court held that the payment is deductible "only to the extent that the
amount... exceeds the fair market value of any material benefit received in return." Id. at 253.
58. See generally Richard D. Hobbett, Charitable Contributions-How Charitable Must They
Be?, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1980).
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the Court of Claims articulated a new standard so that the subjective ap-
proach would not have to be "wrestled with."' The new standard pro-
vided that if the benefits received or expected to be received are substantial,
the transfer is not a deductible charitable contribution.6 The following
year, in Oppewal v. Commissioner,62 the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit expressed dissatisfaction with such subjective tests and relied solely on
the difference between the payment and the value of the benefit received.63
Six years later, the Claims Court applied the IRS's two-prong test to the
facts in American Bar Endowment v. United States' and denied the four
claimants a charitable contribution deduction.6" However, the court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that "well established principles of tax law from this
circuit and elsewhere require that we reject the unitary approach of the
court below."66 The court rejected a pure motivational requirement be-
cause it placed too harsh of a burden on taxpayers.67 Also, the court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with an "overly precise formulaic test."68
B. The Supreme Court Ruling in ABE
In 1986, the Supreme Court, in United States v. American Bar Endow-
ment,69 was presented with its first opportunity to consider the deductibility
of dual character payments. The Court held as follows:
[T]he Claims Court applied the proper standard. The sine qua non
of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property with-
out adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a mini-
mum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property
in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return. 70
59. 449 F.2d 413 (CL Cl. 1971), subsequent proceeding 197 Ct. Cl. 1091 (1972).
60. Id. at 423.
61. In Singer, the Court of Claims refused to apply the two-pronged test adopted by the tax
court because the test included a motivational approach. The court held that a charitable deduc-
tion is allowed only if donation exceeds the market value of the benefit received. Id. The court, in
essence, applied only part one of a two-part test created by the Internal Revenue Service. See
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
62. 468 F.2d 1000 (lst Cir. 1972).
63. Id at 1002. The court solely relied on the difference between the amount of the payment
and the value of the benefit received. By doing so, the court rejected the two-part test established
by the Internal Revenue Service. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
64. 4 Cl. Ct. 404 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
65. Id. at 415.
66. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 1581.
68. Id at 1582. The court stated that an intention to enter into a charitable transaction is
often intertwined with other motivations. Id.
69. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
70. Id at 118.
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The facts in American Bar Endownment clearly illustrate the two-prong
test. American Bar Endowment (ABE) is a charitable organization exempt
from taxation. ABE raised money for its charitable work by providing
group life insurance policies to members of the American Bar Association
(ABA). Favorable group rates resulted in a substantially lower insurance
cost for ABE. Rather than passing the lower cost on to ABA members,
however, ABE priced its policies competitively with other insurance poli-
cies offered to the public, using the excess for its charitable purposes. Fur-
ther, ABE advised its insured that each member's share of the excess fund
constituted a tax-deductible contribution. Subsequently, the IRS audited
ABE's tax returns and assessed a tax deficiency on ABE's net revenues from
the insurance program. ABE brought an action for a refund in the Claims
Court. In a consolidated suit, four individual ABE members sued the IRS
for a tax refund, claiming that they were entitled to a charitable deduction
for part of the insurance premiums they paid.71
Three of the taxpayers failed to establish that they could have purchased
comparable insurance for less money. Thus, the Court held that the value
of ABE's insurance to those taxpayers equaled their premium payments.72
Because they did not demonstrate that their payments exceeded the market
value of the insurance they received, the taxpayers failed part one of the
ABE test.
The fourth taxpayer demonstrated that a group insurance program ex-
isted for which he was eligible and which offered lower premiums than
ABE's insurance. The taxpayer failed to establish, however, that he was
aware of that competing program when he purchased insurance from
ABE.7" Thus, he failed part two of the test-that he intentionally gave
away more than he received.74
In summary, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the payment
exceeds the fair market value of any benefit received and that the excess was
intended as a gift.7" An intention to make a gift requires the taxpayer to
demonstrate that at the time a contribution was made, the contribution ex-
ceeded the value of the return benefits.76 Thus, the second prong of the
IRS's test, requiring subjective intention to make a gift, has been replaced
71. Id. at 106-10.




76. The intent to make a gift must be present at the time of the transfer. Mason v. United
States, 513 F.2d 25, 28 (7th Cir. 1975). However, the intent to claim a deduction can arise after
the transfer, such as the time a tax return is prepared. Id.
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by an objective factual determination dependent upon the taxpayer's knowl-
edge of the value of any benefit received.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS THAT SOLICIT
DUAL CHARACTER PAYMENTS
The IRS has issued guidelines for charities that solicit dual payment
contributions.77 The guidelines suggest that charities soliciting dual charac-
ter payments should determine the fair market value of any benefits given to
donors in return for their contributions and advise donors that this amount
is not deductible.78 Specifically, the IRS asks charities to do the following:
In those cases in which a fund-raising activity is designed to so-
licit payments which are intended to be in part a gift and in part the
purchase price of admission to or other participation in an event of
the type in question, the organization conducting the activity should
employ procedures which make clear not only that a gift is being
solicited in connection with the sale of the admissions or other privi-
leges related to the fund-raising event, but also, the amount of the
gift being solicited. To do this, the amount properly attributable to
the purchase of admissions or other privileges and the amount solic-
ited as a gift should be determined in advance of the solicitation.
The respective amounts should be stated in making the solicitation
and clearly indicated on any ticket, receipt, or other evidence issued
in connection with the payment.79
The IRS provided charities with additional guidelines in 1990, partly in
response to Congress's concern "that charities do not accurately inform
their patrons of the extent to which contributions are deductible."80 Con-
gress stated that it:
anticipates that the Internal Revenue Service will monitor the extent
to which taxpayers are being furnished accurate and sufficient infor-
mation by charitable organizations as to the nondeductibility of pay-
ments to such organizations where benefits or privileges are received
in return, so that taxpayers can correctly compute their Federal in-
come tax liability.81
Shortly after Congress expressed concern in 1987, the IRS sent a
message to over 400,000 charities.82 The message asked "charities for help
in informing contributors more accurately about the deductibility of contri-
77. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
78. Id. at 105.
79. Id. at 105-06.
80. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 471.
81. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1608 (1987)).
82. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated the following:
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butions made in connection with fund-raising events and programs." 3 The
message also contained a copy of the relevant tax laws regarding dual
payments. 4
In response, many charities suggested that the rulings were too difficult
or too burdensome, especially in the case of token value benefits.8 5 Previ-
ously, the charity was required to estimate the fair market value of these
benefits and inform taxpayers how much of their donation was deductible.8 6
In 1990, the IRS issued additional guidelines which provide a safe harbor
for insubstantial items.8 7 If the benefits are within these guidelines, the
charity can inform donors that the entire payment is deductible.88
Although Congress expressed concern, it passed no new penalties for
noncompliance with the IRS revenue rulings and guidelines. Thus, to de-
termine whether charities can currently be penalized for failing to comply
with the guidelines and rulings, the existing penalties will be examined.
V. APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING PENALTIES TO DUAL
CHARACTER PAYMENTS
Obviously, the IRS wants to deter charities from misleading taxpayers
regarding the deductibility of dual payments. As evidenced by the guide-
lines issued to charities in 1988,89 the current practice of the IRS is to moni-
tor charities and then audit their contributors if the charity has not
complied with the guidelines. The guidelines state:
Where it is disclosed that the public or the patrons of a fund-
raising affair for charity have been erroneously informed concerning
the extent of the deductibility of their payments in connection with
the affair, it necessarily follows that all charitable contribution de-
ductions claimed with respect to payments made in connection with
I am concerned that sponsors of fundraising events have often failed to provide written
information on the extent to which payments for such affairs are deductible as charitable
contributions. There has been widespread misunderstanding of the limitations on the de-
ductibility of such payments. This misunderstanding has led, of course, to erroneous tax
reporting of these payments by some patrons.
U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 1391, DEDUCTIBILITY OF
PAYMENTS MADE TO CHARITIES CONDUCTING FUND-RAISING EVENTS (1988).
83. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 471.
84. Publication 1391 was issued in June 1988 and contained a message from the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue and a copy of Revenue Ruling 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
85. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 472.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 37.
88. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 472.
89. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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the particular event or affair will be subject to special scrutiny and
may be questioned in audit of returns.9°
Deficiencies may be assessed against any contributor who has deducted
the entire amount of a dual payment. Additionally, in appropriate cases the
IRS may impose underpayment penalties on the contributors.91
Monitoring charities and assessing deficiencies against their contribu-
tors is less efficient than directly deterring charities from issuing erroneous
and false information to contributors regarding the deductibility of their
dual payments. Utilizing existing penalties or enacting new penalties that
can be assessed directly against charities would be a more effective deterrent
and would also facilitate taxpayer compliance.
A. Penalty for Failing to Disclose Nondeductibility of Contributions
Taxpayers may deduct charitable contributions only if made to qualified
organizations. 92 Some tax-exempt organizations, such as political organiza-
tions, are not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions.93 Congress
expressed concern that some of these tax-exempt organizations mislead tax-
payers by implying that donations are deductible when in fact they are not.
In the Revenue Act of 1987, Congress attempted to correct this problem
by enacting new disclosure requirements. Under Section 6113, these orga-
nizations must disclose in a conspicuous and easily recognizable statement
that contributions are not deductible for federal income tax purposes.94
Under Section 6710, a penalty is imposed on the organization for each day
of noncompliance. 95 The maximum penalty is $10,000 per calendar year.96
However, this limitation does not apply if there is intentional disregard of
these rules; the daily penalty may be more.97
Section 6113 should help solve the issue Congress was addressing. The
problem, however, is that Section 6113 is extremely limited; the disclosure
90. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 106.
91. I.R.C. § 6662 (Supp. 11 1991).
92. Organizations must be a qualified donee. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988); see also supra note 8.
93. However, any organization described in § 170(c) is eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions.
94. The disclosure requirement applies to all solicitations, regardless of whether the organiza-
tion labels the payments as contributions, donations, gifts, membership dues or fees, or whether
the solicitation is for money, stock, property, or for services. A. Mark Christopher, Political Ac-
tivities Become More Risky for Tax-Exempts Due to RA '87, 68 J. TAX'N 136, 136 (1988).
95. I.R.C. § 6710 (1988).
96. I.R.C. § 6710(a) (1988).
97. I.R.C. § 6710(c) (1988).
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requirement does not apply to all tax-exempt organizations.9" Organiza-
tions eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, which are the focus of
this Comment, are exempt from the Section 6113 requirements.99
B. Penalty for Aiding and Abetting Understatement of Tax Liability
In 1982, faced with a huge compliance gap, 1°° Congress enacted a new
arena of Code provisions under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA).10 The most important objective of TEFRA was to
improve compliance with the existing tax laws, which meant adding penal-
ties for failing to comply.102 One of the penalties created by TEFRA was
Section 6701, "Penalties for Aiding and Abetting Understatement of Tax
Liability." The next section will examine the focus of Section 6701 to deter-
mine what constitutes a violation. This section will also examine whether
Section 6701 can be used to penalize charities that intentionally or negli-
gently advise taxpayers that the entire amount of their dual payment contri-
bution is deductible.
1. The Focus of Section 6701
Section 6701103 imposes a penalty for aiding and abetting in the under-
statement of a tax liability. The penalty is imposed on any person who:
(1) aids or assists in the preparation or presentation of a return or
other document;
(2) knows (or has reason to believe) that such portion will be used in
any material matter; and
(3) knows that such portion (if so used) will result in an understate-
ment of the person's tax liability. 1"
As explained in the Senate Finance Committee Report (the "Senate Re-
port"), 105 Section 6701 has four purposes:
98. Section 6113 applies only to organizations that are not described in § 170(c) but are de-
scribed in § 501(c) or § 501(d) and that are political organizations. I.R.C. § 6113(b)(1) (1988).
99. I.R.C. § 6113(b)(1).
100. The compliance gap refers to "the total annual revenue lost to the United States Treas-
ury due to taxpayers' underreporting of income, overstatement of deductions, and failure to file
any tax returns at all." Jordan H. Mintz, Guess Who Uncle Sam Wants Now: An Analysis of the
Tax Advisor Aiding and Abetting Penalty, 63 TAXES 221, 221 (1985). In 1985, the compliance gap
had reached nearly $100 billion, and nonfilers were estimated at over six million. Id. at 222.
101. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
102. Mintz, supra note 100, at 222.
103. I.R.C. § 6701(a) (Supp. III 1991).
104. Id.




to permit more effective enforcement of the tax laws by discouraging
tax preparers from aiding taxpayers in fraudulent underpayment of
taxes, to provide equivalent civil penalties for tax preparers as exist
for taxpayers, to provide noncriminal penalty for tax preparers, and
to protect taxpayers from tax preparers who would lead them into
fraudulent conduct.106
"Thus, the overriding intent in enacting Section 6701 was to deter the filing
of fraudulent or false tax returns."10 7
By enacting Section 6701, Congress attempted to fill a gap in the civil
penalty provisions of the Code. The Senate Report stated:
Present law provides a criminal penalty for willfully aiding, assisting
in, procuring, counseling or advising the preparation or presentation
of a false or fraudulent return ...or other document under the
internal revenue laws .... There is no comparable civil penalty on
persons who aid or assist in the preparation or presentation of false
or fraudulent documents. However, income tax return preparers
who willfully attempt to understate the liability for tax for any per-
son are subject to a penalty of $500 per return.18
Thus, Section 6701 imposes civil penalties for the preparation of fraudulent
documents and attempts to fill the gap between criminal liability and willful
attempts to understate tax liability on a return.109 "Although section 6701
does not literally require intent.., to defraud, the Senate Report strongly
suggests that Congress intended that the new aiding and abetting penalty
would apply only ... where a false or fraudulent return document is filed
with knowledge that [it] will result in an understatement of tax."110
2. What Constitutes a Violation Under Section 6701
The first element of Section 6701 requires assistance in return or docu-
ment preparation. Although most cases arising under Section 6701 involve
penalties imposed on tax preparers, Congress intended for the penalty to
apply in many situations. The Senate Report refers to a similar criminal
penalty"11 that has been interpreted to apply to a variety of cases.' 12 Specif-
106. Sansom v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (N.D. Fla. 1988), motion denied, 707
F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
107. Id
108. S. REP. No. 530, supra note 105, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1021-22.
109. Sansom, 703 F. Supp. at 1510.
110. Mintz, supra note 100, at 224.
111. The comparable penalty is § 7206. "In connection with § 6701, it appears that Congress
specifically intended to create a provision to penalize aiding and abetting conduct similar to that
conduct punished under § 7206." Mattingly v. United States, 924 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1991).
112. Cf S. REP. No. 530, supra note 105, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1022.
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ically, the Senate Report refers to a case in which the defendants, who were
neither taxpayers nor tax preparers, were charged with supplying to a tax-
payer documents that they knew contained materially false matters. 1 3 By
analogy, a charity assists in federal tax document preparation every time it
issues a receipt to a taxpayer indicating the amount of the donation that is
deductible.
Section 6701 also requires that a person know, or have reason to believe,
that the document will be used in any material matter. Although "mate-
rial" has not been defined under Section 6701,114 it has been defined under a
comparable criminal penalty.' 15 In general, any "false statements relating
to gross income, irrespective of the amount constitute a material misstate-
ment in violation of Sec. 7206(). " 116 As a result, "any failure to report
income is material."1" 7 The underlying concern in these cases is that unre-
ported gross income results in an understatement of tax liability.
By analogy, when a taxpayer overstates a deduction, the result is an
understatement of tax liability. Consequently, when a charity informs a
taxpayer that the entire dual payment is deductible, it is a material matter
under the Internal Revenue laws regardless of the amount of the donation.
Further, Treasury Regulation section 1. 170A- 131 8 provides that charitable
deductions must be substantiated. Receipts issued by charities satisfy this
requirement. 119
The third element in Section 6701 requires that a person "know" that, if
so used, the document will result in an understatement of the tax liability of
another person. The use of the word "know" is unique to this penalty.
"All other penalty provisions refer to 'negligence,' 'intentional disregard,'
113. United States v. Siegel, 472 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 989
(1982). In Siegel, the defendants were floor brokers in a foreign exchange. The court held that the
defendants' claim that the case was unique because neither the taxpayer nor the tax preparer had
been charged was simply a distinction without a difference. Id. at 444.
114. One exception is Warner v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D. Fla. 1989). In
Warner, the defendant argued that individual deductions claimed by the plaintiff were material.
The deductions ranged from $114 to $69,357. The court stated that the plaintiff provided no
evidence or authority to prove that the deductions were not material. Further, the court held that
the deductions were sufficiently substantial to constitute a material matter. Id. at 1290.
115. See supra note 111.
116. United States v. DeGroote, 122 F.R.D. 131, 143 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
117. United States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1989). The court is less con-
cerned that trivial mistakes will be prosecuted because of the requirement of specific intent to
violate the law. 1d.; see also United States v. Young, 804 F.2d 116, 119 (8th Cir. 1986) (Omission
of any information to complete gross income is material.).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in 1992).
119. Id. See generally Jacquin D. Bierman, Revenue Service Issues New Rules on Substantiat-
ing Gifts, 62 J. TAX'N 186 (1985).
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or 'willfulness' in determining whether the particular penalty should
apply." 120
The scienter requirement of Section 6701 was first analyzed in Sansom
v. United States. 2' Sansom involved an accountant who was a tax
preparer.122 The issue was whether the plaintiff "knew" that his action
would result in an understatement of tax liability for his client. 123
The court concluded that actual knowledge is necessary to prove a vio-
lation under Section 6701.124 In reaching this conclusion, the court looked
to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and
the statutory scheme established by Congress. First, the court addressed
the plain meaning of the statute:
The plain language of the statute ("knows") indicates that actual
knowledge is necessary.... Simply put, "know" requires knowledge
- awareness of the facts and the ultimate result of the conduct....
Congress, however, wrote Section 6701 to require actual knowledge,
excluding the "conscious disregard" standard, and there is no evi-
dence in the statute that such a standard should be inferred by this
Court. 125
Second, the court rejected the application of a willful standard, stating
that "both the Senate and House reports indicate that Section 6701 is not
intended to apply if the tax preparer is subject to the penalty for negligence
or intentional disregard of regulations." 12 6
Finally, the court stated that the higher standard of proof of scienter is
consistent with the overall statutory scheme of income tax penalties. 2 '
Congress provided a gradation in the amount of penalties that is dependent
on the scienter requirement. For example, Section 6701 imposes a $1,000
penalty 128 upon the preparer, compared to a $ 100 negligence penalty 129 and
a $500 willful penalty.'30
120. Mintz, supra note 100, at 225.
121. 703 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. Fla. 1988), motion denied, 707 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
122. Sansom was penalized because he failed to investigate the results of a client's audit for
several years to determine whether the client was eligible for income averaging. Id. at 1509.
123. To impose a penalty under § 6701, the burden is on the government to prove that the
plaintiff had knowledge that his conduct would result in an understatement of tax liability. Id. at
1508. See infra note 132, for a discussion on the standard of proof required.
124. In Sansom, the government's position was that the scienter element of § 6701 is
equivalent to a willfulness standard. Sansom, 703 F. Supp. at 1510.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1511.
127. Id
128. I.R.C. § 6701(b) (Supp. III 1991).
129. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6694(a) (Supp. III 1991).
130. See, eg., I.R.C. § 6694(b) (Supp. III 1991).
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Three years later, Mattingly v. United States13 1 addressed the scienter
requirement in Section 6701. The court confirmed the Sansom require-
ment: "[W]e believe actual knowledge, as opposed to the less stringent will-
ful blindness, is required. Some cases have been brought to our attention
which support this conclusion, and we are aware of none which directly
disputes it."' 32
3. Difficulty of Imposing a Section 6701 Penalty on Charities
The government bears the burden of proof in aiding and abetting pen-
alty cases. 133 To impose the penalty on a charitable organization, the gov-
emnment must prove actual knowledge-awareness of the facts and the
ultimate result of the conduct.134 Thus, the issue arises as to when, if ever,
the penalty can be imposed on a charity.
Assume that the following three individuals work at charity X:135 the
president, a solicitor, and a worker. The solicitor conducts solicitation on
the telephone by offering tickets to a fund-raising dinner valued at $25 in
return for a $100 contribution. Further, the ticket or receipt states that the
entire payment is tax deductible.
The government would have difficulty in imposing a penalty for aiding
and abetting an understatement of tax liability in this scenario. First, the
organization 136 could be held liable only if the president or solicitor had
actual knowledge that the receipt would be used to substantiate a charitable
deduction and, if used, would result in an understatement of a contributor's
tax liability. To carry this burden, the government would have to prove
that the president or solicitor was familiar with the related dual payment
revenue rulings and case law. Not only would this be difficult and cumber-
some to prove, but "actual knowledge" may be lacking in many cases be-
131. 924 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1991).
132. Id. at 791. Although courts agree that actual knowledge is required to prove a violation
under § 6701, courts disagree on the standard of proof required. Compare Warner v. United
States, 700 F. Supp. 532, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that the government should be held to a
stringent level of proof, namely the clear and convincing evidence standard) with In re Mitchell,
109 B.R. 434, 436 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1989) (deciding that a preponderance standard is the
proper standard to apply because courts in the same district apply that standard to § 6700 and
§ 6702).
133. I.R.C. 6703(a) (1988).
134. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
135. For other examples that illustrate how much and what kind of dual character payments
are deductible, see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; see also 3 BENDER's FEDERAL TAX SER-
VICE, supra note 8, § A:17.41(4).
136. One issue is whether the organization would be held liable or whether the president and
solicitor would be held liable. Under the 1986 version of the Code, a person includes an organiza-
tion as well as an officer or employee of a corporation.
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cause many contributors do not itemize their deductions and therefore are
unable to deduct their charitable contributions. It is unlikely that the presi-
dent or solicitor would know which contributors itemize their deductions as
opposed to those who claim the standard deduction. A more typical scena-
rio would be that president or solicitor negligently or intentionally disre-
garded the rules, in which case a Section 6701 penalty could not be
imposed.
Even if a court held that actual knowledge of a taxpayer's reliance on
the charity's erroneous receipt is not required, 13 7 utilizing this penalty is
complicated by the fact that different people may be involved in preparing
the receipt and soliciting the contribution.
The fact that a ministerial employee types a receipt which states that the
entire payment is deductible does not absolve others from the penalty. Lia-
bility depends on whether any person with knowledge directed the prepara-
tion of the receipt or failed to prevent its preparation. 138 The penalty "does
not apply to any person who merely furnishes typing ... or other mechani-
cal assistance in preparation of the return."' 139
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Existing penalties do not effectively penalize charitable organizations
that erroneously or falsely advise taxpayers that their entire dual payment is
deductible."a To deter charities from engaging in this behavior, a new pen-
alty is needed. 4'
137. The court would be relying on the language in § 6701(a)(2) that "any person... who
knows (or has reason to believe) that such portion... would result in an understatement.., shall
pay a penalty." The "has reason to believe" language was added to § 6701 in 1991. I.R.C.
§ 6701(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
138. Section 6701(a) imposes a penalty on any person who procures the preparation of any
document. The legislative history indicates that the term "procures" includes ordering or other-
wise causing a subordinate to do an act subject to this penalty, or knowing of and not attempting
to prevent participation of a subordinate. S. REP. No. 530, supra note 105, at 266, 275, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1022.
139. I.R.C. § 6701(e) (1988).
140. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
141. Most states have passed legislation regulating charitable organizations. The regulation
is aimed at the prevention of fraud practiced by persons pretending to represent legitimate con-
cerns as well as making the charities more efficient in their spending of public contributions.
Karen S. Quandt, Comment, The Regulation of Charitable Fundraising and Spending Activities,
1975 WIs. L. Rnv. 1158, 1171. The statutes require registration of charitable organizations. Id.
at 1164. Information such as the name, address, and purpose of the charity must be disclosed. Id.
at 1165. The statutes attempt to prohibit fraud and deceptive solicitation. For example, Wiscon-
sin empowers the attorney general to bring an action against a charity that "employed in any
solicitation any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.., by means of any false pretense, represen-
tation or promise." Wis. STAT. § 440.41(8)(b) (1991-92). However, such provisions have been
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The penalty proposed in this Comment 42 is modelled after a negligence
penalty that is imposed on taxpayers who understate their tax liability.'43
The penalty would place the burden of proof on the charity and would act
as a deterrent. Because charities may find it burdensome to determine the
fair market value of benefits contributors receive, the proposed penalty
would apply only if the charity indicated that any portion of a contribution
was deductible. Thus, if valuation is burdensome, the charity need only
refrain from stating that any part of the contribution is deductible. Prior to
proposing a new penalty, an alternative that modifies an existing penalty
will be considered.
A. Broaden the Scope of Section 6113
Under Section 6113, certain organizations must disclose that contribu-
tions or gifts to such organizations are not deductible for federal income tax
purposes.' 44 A penalty of $1000 is imposed on the organization for each
day that it fails to comply. 45 The maximum penalty is $10,000 per calen-
dar year. 146 However, the section only applies to an organization "which is
not described in Section 170(c)" and which is described in Section 501 and
which is a political organization. 47 In summary, charities eligible to re-
ceive tax-deductible contributions are exempt from this section.
strictly interpreted and have not been used to prosecute charities that legitimately exist as fun-
draising organizations. Quandt, supra, at 1172. Certain groups are exempt from registration and
regulation. These groups include religious groups, educational institutions, and groups that solicit
contributions solely from their membership. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 440.41(3).
142. The proposed penalty would not violate the Constitution's Establishment Clause. First,
the penalty would treat all religious and nonreligious charitable organizations alike. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (stating that the clearest command of the Establishment Clause
is that one religious denomination cannot be preferred over another); see also Carl H. Esbeck,
Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984). Second, several existing penalties are imposed on tax-exempt
organizations. See I.R.C. §§ 6113, 6711 (1988).
143. I.R.C. § 6662 (1991). In 1989, Congress passed the Improved Penalty Administration
and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT), Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721, 103 Stat. 2106, 2395 (1989)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (Supp. III 1991)). Section 6662 is applicable to returns
with due dates after December 31, 1989. Id. Under IMPACT, negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations is generally defined as under prior law. Thus, the old negligence § 6653(a) is useful in
analyzing what actions constitute negligence under the current negligence penalties of § 6662(c).
See generally Richard C. Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental Changes in Civil Penalties, 72 J.
TAX'N 132 (1990).
144. I.R.C. § 6113(a) (1988). The organizations are not eligible to receive charitable contri-
butions regardless of whether the donation is a dual payment.
145. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. I.R.C. § 6113(b) (1988).
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Congress could broaden the scope of Section 6113 by deleting the words
"which is not described in section 170(c)." '148 The alternative section would
require all charities to disclose to contributors that contributions are not
deductible if the taxpayer receives a benefit equal in value to the contribu-
tion. The new section would be inapplicable, however, when charities so-
licit dual payment contributions that consist of part gift and part return
benefit.149
B. Proposed Penalty
The penalty could be modelled after Section 6662 of the Code, "Imposi-
tion of Accuracy-Related Penalty."15 For example, the proposed penalty
could read as follows:
(a) If any organization described in Section 170(c) negligently fur-
nishes erroneous or false information in a fund-raising solicitation
regarding deductibility of contributions solicited, a penalty of $500
per occurrence shall be assessed.
(b) If any organization described in Section 170(c) intentionally fur-
nishes erroneous or false information in a fund-raising solicitation
regarding deductibility of contributions solicited, a penalty of $1,000
per occurrence shall be assessed.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "fund-raising solicitation"
means any solicitation of contributions or gifts as part of a coordi-
nated fund-raising campaign or event which is made:
(1) in written or printed form; (2) by television or radio; or
(3) by telephone.
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "per occurrence" refers to
the coordinated fund-raising campaign or event and not to each
communication made to individual contributors.
Under parts (a) and (b), the proposed penalty would apply only to char-
ities that affirmatively indicate that all or part of a contributor's payment is
deductible. It is designed to deter charities from making erroneous or false
statements regarding deductibility. The penalty is not burdensome 51 be-
cause charities can avoid it by not stating that a contribution is deductible.
148. Id.
149. If a taxpayer makes a contribution to a charity and receives a benefit in return that is
equal in value to the payment, the contribution is not deductible. In dual payment cases, part of
the contribution is deductible under the two-part test adopted in American Bar Endowment. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
150. I.R.C. § 6662 (Supp. III 1991).
151. Charities have suggested that current guidelines are sometimes burdensome. See supra
notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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Since the option of silence is provided, 152 there is little, if any, justification
for a charity's affirmative erroneous or false statement.
Also, the option of silence protects charities when the value of return
benefits varies among contributors. This option is important for charities,
such as the American Bar Endowment (ABE), that solicit contributions as
part of a group insurance plan. Since the determination of the deductible
portion of these payments depends on whether the contributor was aware of
a plan offering lower premiums,153 ABE cannot accurately determine what
portion of each contributor's payment is deductible. To avoid the proposed
penalty, ABE and other charities that use similar fund-raising techniques
will need to refrain from asserting that a definite portion of the payment is
deductible. Only the contributor has the necessary facts to make this
determination.
The proposed penalty uses the terms "negligently" and "intentionally"
as they are used in other penalty provisions and as they have been defined
by case law.1 54 "Negligence is lack of due care or failure to do what a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the circum-
stances." '55 Penalties based on intentional disregard apply when a person
"who is aware or should be aware of a rule or regulation chooses to ignore
its requirements." '156
Good-faith reliance on professional advice is a defense to negligence.15 7
Because of the good-faith requirement, however, a professional advisor can-
not be carelessly selected. Thus, no penalty would be imposed if a charity
hired a professional to value return benefits, even if the advice given was
erroneous.
Under part (a) of the proposed penalty, a $500 penalty is imposed if the
charity negligently provides erroneous or false information to a contributor.
Negligence includes carelessly computing the market value of the return
benefit or carelessly relying on professional advice. The penalty does not
152. The current IRS guidelines require charities to affirmatively indicate the amount of a
contribution that is deductible. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. The guidelines
would need to be modified to indicate the possibility of silence.
153. The contributor must have knowledge of lower premiums at the time of transfer. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 143.
155. Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1044 (1968).
156. Id.
157. Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1986) (hiring an attorney or ac-
countant does not insulate the taxpayer from negligence penalties, but good-faith reliance on pro-
fessional advice concerning tax laws is a defense).
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apply if a charity can show that a reasonable basis was used to determine
the fair market value of any return benefits.158
Under part (b), a $1,000 penalty is imposed if erroneous or false infor-
mation is intentionally provided. The higher penalty applies when the char-
ity knew, or should have known, of the requirements in this penalty but
made no attempt to determine the fair market value of the return benefit.
The proposed penalty would be inapplicable when the return benefit was
insubstantial, such as a bookmark, mug, or calendar bearing the charity's
name or logo. These types of benefits may be disregarded in determining
the amount of the deductible contribution. 5 9 Additionally, the penalty
under this section would be imposed per fund-raising campaign or event
because it would be cumbersome to account for the vast number of written
or other communications issued by charities.
The penalty amounts are merely suggestions. For organizations that
solicit and collect large sums, the penalty amounts may be too low. For
example, in American Bar Endowment," ° over 55,000 American Bar Asso-
ciation members participated in the group insurance program.' 61 Over the
years that the insurance program has been in effect, American Bar Endow-
ment has netted $81.9 million in dividends, $63 million of which it devoted
to its charitable endeavors.1 62 When setting the penalty amounts, Congress
may determine that because funds raised by charities vary, the amount of
penalties should be a percentage of the revenues raised from solicitations
involving false or erroneous information regarding the deductibility of
contributions.
CONCLUSION
Charitable contributions have become a big business in America. Tax-
payers can claim these contributions as itemized deductions. However,
dual payment contributions are deductible only to the extent that the pay-
ment exceeds the fair market value of any benefit received and if the excess
was intended to be a gift. Due to the latter requirement, the contributor
must know that their contribution exceeds the market value of the return
benefit when the payment is made.
158. The IRS guidelines merely require that a reasonable estimate of fair market value be
used. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
160. 4 Cl. Ct. 404 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 1573 (1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
161. American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 406.
162. Id at 408.
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Nevertheless, some charities erroneously or falsely advise contributors
that their entire dual payment is deductible. Furthermore, some charities
ignore the current IRS guidelines providing that charities should determine
the fair market value and indicate that this portion of the contribution is
not deductible.
Existing penalties do not effectively deter charities that ignore these
guidelines. Rather, Congress is relying on charities to voluntarily educate
their members regarding the relevant tax laws. Congress is also depending
on the IRS to monitor the charities' compliance. The only existing deter-
rent is indirect. That is, charities may refrain from issuing erroneous or
false receipts if they fear that future fund-raising campaigns will be hurt if
their contributors are audited and assessed deficiencies against them. This
is a minor deterrent because few taxpayers are actually audited and the
contributors are unlikely to communicate among themselves.
To facilitate taxpayer compliance, Congress should enact an additional
penalty. The penalty proposed by this Comment is modelled after a negli-
gence standard. A penalty would be imposed for each occurrence and the
amount would depend on whether the charity negligently or intentionally
furnished erroneous or false information to contributors regarding the de-
ductibility of their donations.
The proposed penalty is intended to serve primarily as a deterrent. It
can easily be avoided by ascertaining the fair market value of return benefits
and using the fair market value to accurately inform taxpayers of the
amount of the deductible contribution. It is not overly burdensome, be-
cause it can be avoided by not affirmatively stating how much of the pay-
ment is a deductible contribution. The proposed penalty protects taxpayers
from misrepresentation and is a more efficient deterrent than the current
IRS policy of monitoring charities.
GREGORY I. DEVORKIN
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